Card or dice? An improved experimental approach to measure dishonesty

IF 2.5 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Daniel Hermann , Selina Bruns , Oliver Mußhoff
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We introduce a modified die-roll experiment carried out in Germany and Cambodia to measure precise dishonesty rates, while the individual lie is not observable to the experimenter. Participants draw an envelope from a box containing many envelopes. Each envelope contains a card depicting a die number, which participants view in private and then deposit into a different box filled with many envelopes. The payoff of participants depends on the reported number, thereby creating an incentive to dishonestly report numbers with higher payoffs. Although the individual lie remains hidden from the experimenter, the drawn distribution of cards by a group of participants is known. Results of the modified experiment are compared to the classical die-roll task, in which individual dishonesty is private information and the outcome distribution is assumed, based on a probability function. The comparison reveals that the modified card method shows comparable levels of lying to the classical die-roll task among students, but not among smallholders in rural Cambodia. Considering the farmers, the number of liars is lower in the card task compared to the die-roll task. Although the individual lie is not observable, we find partially different dishonesty proportions between numbers comparing the two tasks. This suggests that the observability of the drawn distribution affects the costs of lying.
牌还是骰子?一种改进的测量不诚实的实验方法
我们介绍了在德国和柬埔寨进行的一项改进的模滚实验,以测量精确的不诚实率,而实验者无法观察到个人的谎言。参与者从装有许多信封的盒子中抽出一个信封。每个信封里都有一张卡片,上面写着一个骰子号码,参与者私下查看,然后把卡片存入一个装满许多信封的盒子里。参与者的回报取决于报告的数字,从而产生了不诚实地报告更高回报的数字的动机。虽然个人的谎言对实验者来说是隐藏的,但是一组参与者抽到的卡片的分布是已知的。将改进后的实验结果与经典的掷骰子任务进行了比较,经典掷骰子任务中,个体不诚实是私有信息,并且假设结果分布基于概率函数。比较表明,改进的卡片方法在学生中显示出与传统的掷骰子任务相当的谎言水平,但在柬埔寨农村的小农中却没有。考虑到农民,与掷骰子任务相比,卡片任务中的说谎者数量更少。虽然个人的谎言是不可观察到的,但我们发现比较两个任务的数字之间的不诚实比例部分不同。这表明,绘制的分布的可观察性会影响说谎的代价。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
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