{"title":"Do higher insurance premiums provoke larger reported losses? An experimental study","authors":"William G. Morrison, Bradley J. Ruffle","doi":"10.1111/jori.12502","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether the price paid for insurance explains dishonesty in reporting an insurance claim. In our laboratory experiment, participants earn money in a real-effort task but risk losing some of this income through one of four randomly assigned, privately observed loss amounts. Before observing their loss, participants indicate their reservation price for insurance that pays an indemnity equal to their stated loss. Participants are insured if their randomly assigned premium is less than their stated reservation price. This mechanism provides data on each participant's consumer surplus from insurance. After receiving their cash earnings minus their assigned loss in private, participants report their loss. We find that the insured report modestly but statistically insignificant larger losses than the uninsured. Among the insured, we find no clear evidence that their reporting of excess losses increases in the randomly assigned price of insurance or decreases in the consumer surplus from insurance.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 1","pages":"203-226"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12502","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jori.12502","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We investigate whether the price paid for insurance explains dishonesty in reporting an insurance claim. In our laboratory experiment, participants earn money in a real-effort task but risk losing some of this income through one of four randomly assigned, privately observed loss amounts. Before observing their loss, participants indicate their reservation price for insurance that pays an indemnity equal to their stated loss. Participants are insured if their randomly assigned premium is less than their stated reservation price. This mechanism provides data on each participant's consumer surplus from insurance. After receiving their cash earnings minus their assigned loss in private, participants report their loss. We find that the insured report modestly but statistically insignificant larger losses than the uninsured. Among the insured, we find no clear evidence that their reporting of excess losses increases in the randomly assigned price of insurance or decreases in the consumer surplus from insurance.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Risk and Insurance (JRI) is the premier outlet for theoretical and empirical research on the topics of insurance economics and risk management. Research in the JRI informs practice, policy-making, and regulation in insurance markets as well as corporate and household risk management. JRI is the flagship journal for the American Risk and Insurance Association, and is currently indexed by the American Economic Association’s Economic Literature Index, RePEc, the Social Sciences Citation Index, and others. Issues of the Journal of Risk and Insurance, from volume one to volume 82 (2015), are available online through JSTOR . Recent issues of JRI are available through Wiley Online Library. In addition to the research areas of traditional strength for the JRI, the editorial team highlights below specific areas for special focus in the near term, due to their current relevance for the field.