Can innovative enforcement mechanism work in weak investor protection Countries? Evidence from China

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-02-23 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107294

Chenyu Zhang , Jingyan Li , Deqiu Chen , Xu Lou

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the effect of China Securities Investor Services Center (ISC) shareholding, a joint public–private enforcement mechanism, on mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Employing a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, we demonstrate that acquirers whose shares are owned by the ISC (ISC acquirers) encounter more price-related M&A withdrawals, more bid revisions, and shorter deal durations. Such effects are mainly driven by weak investor protection environments, lack of external supervision, and information asymmetry. Mechanism analysis indicates that ISC shareholding has monitoring and demonstration effects by drawing public attention and encouraging minority shareholder activism. Furthermore, ISC acquirers experience positive market reactions on withdrawal announcements and better long-term performance, such as higher stock returns, lower goodwill impairment, and better financial performance. Overall, our study suggests that as a joint public–private enforcement mechanism, ISC shareholding can protect minority shareholders’ interests, especially when the investor protection is weak. Our findings enrich the understanding of the enforcement mechanisms in emerging markets.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.