Combinatorial Group-Buying double auction for recycled remanufacturing products of construction waste

IF 8.3 1区 工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS
Xiang T.R. Kong , Rui Huang , Kai Kang , Suxiu Xu
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Abstract

Digital trading plays a crucial role in construction waste resource utilization. However, supply–demand imbalance and inefficient pricing exist under a prevalent negotiation-based trading approach and a fixed price mechanism, resulting in high transaction costs and rigid clearing prices. Furthermore, high ask prices restrict the transaction scale of recycled remanufacturing products of construction waste (RRPCW). These deficiencies severely hinder development of RRPCW digital trading market. Motivated by the successful implementation of group-buying in various industries, this article aims to propose a combinatorial group-buying double auction mechanism to deal with the challenges in RRPCW transactions. A combinatorial double auction is firstly established where buyers are allowed to bid on bundles of RRPCW to satisfy their full set of procurement requirements. To further scale up transactions, group-buying is incorporated into the auction, where sellers provide corresponding discounts to their matched buyers when thresholds are reached. Such an approach can effectively leverage buyers’ collective purchasing power and scale effect to lower the purchasing costs. The winner determination problem is solved with a bid density-based scheme, while buyers’ payments and sellers’ revenues are calculated by a critical value-based scheme. Theoretical analysis manifests that the designed mechanism can realize individual rationality, strong budget balance and incentive-compatibility of buyers. Five sensitivity analyses including buyers’ bid prices, threshold levels, discount degrees, seller supply heterogeneity, and buyer demand distribution on the mechanism’s overall performance are examined. Additionally, the results of comparative analysis among the proposed mechanism, its counterparts and the fixed price mechanism under different market conditions demonstrate the superiority of our new designed mechanism. Finally, managerial implications are summarized based on the stakeholders’ multi-dimension perspectives. Especially, we emphasized that the regulatory role of the platform is vital for the sustainable and healthy development in the construction waste trading industry.
建筑垃圾回收再制造产品组合团购双拍
数字交易在建筑垃圾资源化利用中起着至关重要的作用。然而,在普遍的谈判交易方式和固定价格机制下,存在供需失衡和定价效率低下的问题,导致交易成本高,结算价格僵化。此外,高要价限制了建筑垃圾再生再制造产品的交易规模。这些不足严重阻碍了RRPCW数字交易市场的发展。受团购在各行业成功实施的激励,本文旨在提出一种组合团购双拍卖机制来应对RRPCW交易中的挑战。首先建立组合双重拍卖,让买家竞投成批的环保废物,以满足他们的全套采购要求。为了进一步扩大交易规模,团购被纳入到拍卖中,当达到阈值时,卖家向匹配的买家提供相应的折扣。这种方式可以有效地利用购买者的集体购买力和规模效应,降低采购成本。采用基于竞价密度的方案解决赢家确定问题,采用基于临界值的方案计算买方支付和卖方收入。理论分析表明,所设计的机制能够实现个体理性、较强的预算平衡性和购买者的激励兼容性。研究了买方出价、门槛水平、折扣程度、卖方供给异质性和买方需求分布对机制整体性能的五个敏感性分析。此外,本文还对不同市场条件下的定价机制与同类机制进行了对比分析,验证了新机制的优越性。最后,基于利益相关者的多维视角,总结了管理启示。我们特别强调,平台的监管作用对建筑垃圾交易行业的持续健康发展至关重要。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.20
自引率
16.00%
发文量
285
审稿时长
62 days
期刊介绍: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management. Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.
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