{"title":"Token-based reviewer economies: Proposed institutions for managing the reviewer shortage problem","authors":"Cecil Eng Huang Chua","doi":"10.1111/isj.12560","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This opinion paper presents two proposed token-based systems to fix the information system academy's review system. At present, the review system consumes more human resources than the information systems academy has by an order of magnitude. The cost of this overflow is borne entirely by information systems researchers. I argue this is because the review system is based on a gift economy that cannot handle the currently sized market. Both proposals involve the creation of tokens and a central governing body. The first proposal involves a market built around a review bank (central governing body) that issues review tokens that function as a proxy currency. Journals function as intermediaries between authors and reviewers. Authors pay journals for reviews, and journals pay experts such as reviewers and editors for their services. Reviewers exchange their review tokens on the open market or trade review tokens for favours with institutions like universities. The second proposal involves a gift economy where reviewers transfer their allegiance from peers to the information systems academy. In this proposal, each individual token is unique, like a trading card and an affiliation board tracks the transfer of tokens, linking former possessors of a token together in a review ring. As tokens are regifted, they accumulate history, and thereby social worth, captured in the form of messages each possessor writes. Former possession of a large number of tokens and of tokens with particular histories confers status benefits. These benefits in turn lock reviewers into the review ring system encouraging them to do further reviews. Economic, social, and other implications of both policies are discussed and questions are posed for the information systems academy to grapple with. Example issues discussed include the effect of the proposals on the political power of reviewers and shifts in political power in the information systems academy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48049,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems Journal","volume":"35 2","pages":"761-806"},"PeriodicalIF":6.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/isj.12560","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Systems Journal","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isj.12560","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This opinion paper presents two proposed token-based systems to fix the information system academy's review system. At present, the review system consumes more human resources than the information systems academy has by an order of magnitude. The cost of this overflow is borne entirely by information systems researchers. I argue this is because the review system is based on a gift economy that cannot handle the currently sized market. Both proposals involve the creation of tokens and a central governing body. The first proposal involves a market built around a review bank (central governing body) that issues review tokens that function as a proxy currency. Journals function as intermediaries between authors and reviewers. Authors pay journals for reviews, and journals pay experts such as reviewers and editors for their services. Reviewers exchange their review tokens on the open market or trade review tokens for favours with institutions like universities. The second proposal involves a gift economy where reviewers transfer their allegiance from peers to the information systems academy. In this proposal, each individual token is unique, like a trading card and an affiliation board tracks the transfer of tokens, linking former possessors of a token together in a review ring. As tokens are regifted, they accumulate history, and thereby social worth, captured in the form of messages each possessor writes. Former possession of a large number of tokens and of tokens with particular histories confers status benefits. These benefits in turn lock reviewers into the review ring system encouraging them to do further reviews. Economic, social, and other implications of both policies are discussed and questions are posed for the information systems academy to grapple with. Example issues discussed include the effect of the proposals on the political power of reviewers and shifts in political power in the information systems academy.
期刊介绍:
The Information Systems Journal (ISJ) is an international journal promoting the study of, and interest in, information systems. Articles are welcome on research, practice, experience, current issues and debates. The ISJ encourages submissions that reflect the wide and interdisciplinary nature of the subject and articles that integrate technological disciplines with social, contextual and management issues, based on research using appropriate research methods.The ISJ has particularly built its reputation by publishing qualitative research and it continues to welcome such papers. Quantitative research papers are also welcome but they need to emphasise the context of the research and the theoretical and practical implications of their findings.The ISJ does not publish purely technical papers.