Howard H. Wang, Edmund W. Cheng, Xi Chen, Hai Liang
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The prevailing view that authoritarian regimes primarily respond to threats of instability is challenged by our research, which posits that such regimes also take citizen complaints seriously, even when they do not pose a direct threat. Based on 238,835 citizen claims from China's largest national online petition platform from 2020 to 2021 and 793,119 citizen claims from Wuhan's local petition website, this study reveals that online complaints result in greater governmental responsiveness, compared to non-complaints. This institutionalized feedback mechanism is driven by a mix of factors: the upper-level officials' expectation for negative feedback, combined with bureaucrats' efforts to preserve themselves and avoid punitive consequences. Our findings thus enhance the understanding of what drives authoritarian responsiveness and signal a caution that an overreliance on managing complaints may deepen a stability-maintenance mechanism, potentially impeding substantial reform.
期刊介绍:
Governance provides a forum for the theoretical and practical discussion of executive politics, public policy, administration, and the organization of the state. Published in association with International Political Science Association''s Research Committee on the Structure & Organization of Government (SOG), it emphasizes peer-reviewed articles that take an international or comparative approach to public policy and administration. All papers, regardless of empirical focus, should have wider theoretical, comparative, or practical significance.