Demand information disclosure in fresh produce supply chain considering competition between geographical indication and local suppliers

Abstract

When geographical indication fresh produce (GIFP) enters a distant market, demand uncertainty complicates the operational decisions for both the GIFP supplier (GS) and the local fresh produce supplier (LS), whereas the retailer disclosing demand information helps suppliers make optimal decisions. This study aims to explore the impacts of information disclosure on the retailer, GS, and LS and study the information disclosure strategy in the fresh produce supply chain (FPSC). We construct a multistage game model to investigate the retailer's optimal information disclosure decisions and demonstrate the validity of the results through a case study. Furthermore, we develop information contracts to prompt information collaboration in the FPSC. The results show that both the GS and the LS are willing to receive information, whereas the retailer chooses to disclose it voluntarily only when the freshness elasticity is not too low. Moreover, with the improvement in freshness elasticity, the retailer should first disclose to the GS and then to both the GS and LS and finally shift back to the GS. The influences of information disclosure on the performance of the supply chain are relevant to both the freshness elasticity and the quality advantage of the GIFP. Additionally, we identify three scenarios where supply chain performance can be improved by adjusting the retailer's disclosure strategy and propose corresponding contracts on the basis of information fees. This study provides actionable strategies for FPSC stakeholders.