Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Ksenia Shakhgildyan
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Abstract

In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click-through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator of the misspecified model assuming that adjusted bids are the result of the bidding according to the locally envy-free equilibrium of complete information model.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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