Towards an efficient implementation of the EU biodiversity strategy in forests – An analysis of alternative voluntary conservation mechanisms and selection criteria

IF 4 2区 农林科学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Johanna Kangas , Markku Ollikainen
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the European Union's Biodiversity Strategy aim to halt biodiversity loss by 2030. Both include ambitious goals to increase the area of protected land and sea to 30 % with 10 % devoted to strict protection. The required land areas are large and challenge current instruments tailored to meet much less ambitious conservation goals. Forest conservation traditionally relies on voluntary flat-rate or cost compensation policies inviting predominantly conservation-minded landowners to conserve their forests. More efficient instruments are needed to meet the ambitious goals of forest biodiversity conservation. We examine how alternative auction mechanisms perform relative to the current instruments under different selection criteria in promoting strict conservation targets. We demonstrate that the studied mechanisms differ in their ability to invite sites to the conservation program. The auction incentivises higher participation from landowners who do not have strong conservation motives and decreases information rents from landowners with strong conservation motives. When selection criteria favour high-quality sites, like old-growth stands, the auction mechanisms outperform the cost compensation policy by providing the largest area of conserved land and the highest ecological values. Thus, auctions offer a promising option for implementing forest biodiversity conservation in accordance with the EU Biodiversity Strategy.
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来源期刊
Forest Policy and Economics
Forest Policy and Economics 农林科学-林学
CiteScore
9.00
自引率
7.50%
发文量
148
审稿时长
21.9 weeks
期刊介绍: Forest Policy and Economics is a leading scientific journal that publishes peer-reviewed policy and economics research relating to forests, forested landscapes, forest-related industries, and other forest-relevant land uses. It also welcomes contributions from other social sciences and humanities perspectives that make clear theoretical, conceptual and methodological contributions to the existing state-of-the-art literature on forests and related land use systems. These disciplines include, but are not limited to, sociology, anthropology, human geography, history, jurisprudence, planning, development studies, and psychology research on forests. Forest Policy and Economics is global in scope and publishes multiple article types of high scientific standard. Acceptance for publication is subject to a double-blind peer-review process.
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