Yuanyuan Wang , Ruguo Fan , Jinchai Lin , Xiao Xie , Wenjie Zhang , Dipti Srinivasan
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Currently, governments and platforms are exploring subsidy schemes to encourage private charging pile sharing (PCPS), which is essential for the sustainable development of the electric vehicle industry. Nonetheless, the specific modes and their impacts on stakeholders’ decision-making remain unclear. We establish a three-level Stackelberg game model to analyze the interactions among government, platform, and private charger owners. Four practice-driven modes are proposed: both government and platform provide subsidies (BS), government provides subsidies (GS), platform provides subsidies (PS), and no subsidy (NS). Results reveal that BS works better when platform revenue increases, while GS performs better when government revenue rises; Enhancing PCPS benefits and data value promotes cost-effectiveness in BS and GS modes. Conversely, raising platform service fees hinders PCPS and reduces effectiveness; As platform revenue grows, platforms provide subsidies spontaneously, enabling the gradual withdrawal of government subsidies. These findings offer practical insights for policymakers to design targeted and efficient subsidies.
期刊介绍:
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment focuses on original research exploring the environmental impacts of transportation, policy responses to these impacts, and their implications for transportation system design, planning, and management. The journal comprehensively covers the interaction between transportation and the environment, ranging from local effects on specific geographical areas to global implications such as natural resource depletion and atmospheric pollution.
We welcome research papers across all transportation modes, including maritime, air, and land transportation, assessing their environmental impacts broadly. Papers addressing both mobile aspects and transportation infrastructure are considered. The journal prioritizes empirical findings and policy responses of regulatory, planning, technical, or fiscal nature. Articles are policy-driven, accessible, and applicable to readers from diverse disciplines, emphasizing relevance and practicality. We encourage interdisciplinary submissions and welcome contributions from economically developing and advanced countries alike, reflecting our international orientation.