CEO turnover and financial policy transfer

IF 3.8 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Daniel Sungyeon Kim , Kwangwon Ahn , Hanwool Jang , Jaeyoon Lee
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We explore how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnovers influence firms’ capital structures. Our findings indicate that adjustments in capital structure are markedly more significant when the incoming CEO is sourced from outside the firm, compared to internal promotions. Moreover, firms undergoing CEO turnovers tend to realign their actual leverage to target levels more swiftly than those without such changes, with this process being particularly accelerated when the CEO is externally appointed. A notable insight from our analysis is that external CEOs frequently adopt and apply leverage strategies from their previous positions, transferring financial strategies that reflect their past experiences. These patterns remain robust when we specifically examine forced turnovers, suggesting that the external versus internal nature of succession, rather than the reason for turnover, drives the transfer of financial policies.
CEO离职与财务政策转移
我们探讨了首席执行官(CEO)更替如何影响企业的资本结构。我们的研究结果表明,与内部晋升相比,当新任首席执行官来自公司外部时,资本结构的调整会更加明显。此外,经历首席执行官更替的公司往往会比那些没有发生这种变化的公司更快地将其实际杠杆率调整到目标水平,尤其是当首席执行官由外部任命时,这一过程会更快。我们的分析得出了一个值得注意的结论,即外部首席执行官经常采用和应用其前任职位的杠杆战略,转移反映其过去经验的财务战略。当我们专门研究被迫离职的情况时,这些模式依然保持稳定,这表明外部与内部的继任性质,而不是离职原因,是财务政策转移的驱动因素。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
8.30%
发文量
168
期刊介绍: The focus of the North-American Journal of Economics and Finance is on the economics of integration of goods, services, financial markets, at both regional and global levels with the role of economic policy in that process playing an important role. Both theoretical and empirical papers are welcome. Empirical and policy-related papers that rely on data and the experiences of countries outside North America are also welcome. Papers should offer concrete lessons about the ongoing process of globalization, or policy implications about how governments, domestic or international institutions, can improve the coordination of their activities. Empirical analysis should be capable of replication. Authors of accepted papers will be encouraged to supply data and computer programs.
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