Daniel Sungyeon Kim , Kwangwon Ahn , Hanwool Jang , Jaeyoon Lee
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We explore how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnovers influence firms’ capital structures. Our findings indicate that adjustments in capital structure are markedly more significant when the incoming CEO is sourced from outside the firm, compared to internal promotions. Moreover, firms undergoing CEO turnovers tend to realign their actual leverage to target levels more swiftly than those without such changes, with this process being particularly accelerated when the CEO is externally appointed. A notable insight from our analysis is that external CEOs frequently adopt and apply leverage strategies from their previous positions, transferring financial strategies that reflect their past experiences. These patterns remain robust when we specifically examine forced turnovers, suggesting that the external versus internal nature of succession, rather than the reason for turnover, drives the transfer of financial policies.
期刊介绍:
The focus of the North-American Journal of Economics and Finance is on the economics of integration of goods, services, financial markets, at both regional and global levels with the role of economic policy in that process playing an important role. Both theoretical and empirical papers are welcome. Empirical and policy-related papers that rely on data and the experiences of countries outside North America are also welcome. Papers should offer concrete lessons about the ongoing process of globalization, or policy implications about how governments, domestic or international institutions, can improve the coordination of their activities. Empirical analysis should be capable of replication. Authors of accepted papers will be encouraged to supply data and computer programs.