Unions: Wage floors, seniority rules, and unemployment duration

IF 1.9 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Fernando Alvarez , Robert Shimer , Fabrice Tourre
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of unions on unemployment and wages in a dynamic equilibrium search model. We model a union as imposing a minimum wage and rationing jobs to ensure that the union's most senior members are employed. This generates rest unemployment, where following a downturn in their labor market, unionized workers are willing to wait for jobs to reappear rather than search for a new labor market. We characterize the hazard rate of exiting unemployment, and show that it is low at long durations whenever the union-imposed minimum wage is high; we establish that a high union-imposed minimum wage generates a compressed wage distribution and a high turnover rate of jobs — properties consistent with the data. Finally, we show that seniority rules lead to lower unemployment levels, relative to an alternative rule allocating jobs to workers randomly.
工会:最低工资标准、工龄规则和失业期限
本文在一个动态均衡搜索模型中考察了工会对失业和工资的影响。我们把工会的模式设定为规定最低工资,分配工作岗位,以确保工会最资深的成员得到雇佣。这就产生了“休息失业”,在劳动力市场低迷之后,加入工会的工人宁愿等待工作机会重新出现,也不愿寻找新的劳动力市场。我们描述了退出失业的危险率,并表明,当工会规定的最低工资高时,它在长时间内是低的;我们确定,工会规定的高最低工资会产生压缩的工资分配和高的工作流动率——这些属性与数据一致。最后,我们表明,相对于随机分配工作给工人的另一种规则,工龄规则导致更低的失业率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
10.50%
发文量
199
期刊介绍: The journal provides an outlet for publication of research concerning all theoretical and empirical aspects of economic dynamics and control as well as the development and use of computational methods in economics and finance. Contributions regarding computational methods may include, but are not restricted to, artificial intelligence, databases, decision support systems, genetic algorithms, modelling languages, neural networks, numerical algorithms for optimization, control and equilibria, parallel computing and qualitative reasoning.
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