{"title":"Unions: Wage floors, seniority rules, and unemployment duration","authors":"Fernando Alvarez , Robert Shimer , Fabrice Tourre","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104965","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of unions on unemployment and wages in a dynamic equilibrium search model. We model a union as imposing a minimum wage and rationing jobs to ensure that the union's most senior members are employed. This generates rest unemployment, where following a downturn in their labor market, unionized workers are willing to wait for jobs to reappear rather than search for a new labor market. We characterize the hazard rate of exiting unemployment, and show that it is low at long durations whenever the union-imposed minimum wage is high; we establish that a high union-imposed minimum wage generates a compressed wage distribution and a high turnover rate of jobs — properties consistent with the data. Finally, we show that seniority rules lead to lower unemployment levels, relative to an alternative rule allocating jobs to workers randomly.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104965"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016518892400157X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of unions on unemployment and wages in a dynamic equilibrium search model. We model a union as imposing a minimum wage and rationing jobs to ensure that the union's most senior members are employed. This generates rest unemployment, where following a downturn in their labor market, unionized workers are willing to wait for jobs to reappear rather than search for a new labor market. We characterize the hazard rate of exiting unemployment, and show that it is low at long durations whenever the union-imposed minimum wage is high; we establish that a high union-imposed minimum wage generates a compressed wage distribution and a high turnover rate of jobs — properties consistent with the data. Finally, we show that seniority rules lead to lower unemployment levels, relative to an alternative rule allocating jobs to workers randomly.
期刊介绍:
The journal provides an outlet for publication of research concerning all theoretical and empirical aspects of economic dynamics and control as well as the development and use of computational methods in economics and finance. Contributions regarding computational methods may include, but are not restricted to, artificial intelligence, databases, decision support systems, genetic algorithms, modelling languages, neural networks, numerical algorithms for optimization, control and equilibria, parallel computing and qualitative reasoning.