Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

IF 2.4 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Giacomo Battiston , Matteo Bizzarri , Riccardo Franceschin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.
第三方利益、资源价值和冲突的可能性
资源财富会引发掠夺动机,但也会阻止第三方介入冲突。因此,资源价值与冲突概率之间的关系是先天不明确的。本文在一个涉及潜在侵略者和强大第三方的理论框架下研究这种关系。首先,我们证明,当第三方的干预动机足够强时,冲突概率在资源价值上呈驼峰形。其次,我们从理论上确立了资源价值增加了第三方在干预情况下站在资源丰富被告一边的激励,为资源价值高时的稳定提供了另一种机制。第三,我们解释了我们的理论如何与涉及冲突地区(包括国家间或国内冲突)和强大第三方的政策相关案例研究相关联。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
106
期刊介绍: The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).
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