Political control, corporate governance and stock-price crash risk: Evidence from China

IF 4.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Emerging Markets Review Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ememar.2025.101260

Ziyao San , Shuai Wang , Zongfeng Xiu , Ling Zhou , Zejiang Zhou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We find that Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOEs) with Disciplinary Commission members on the board experience lower stock price crash risk than their counterparts. This effect is less pronounced for SOEs with more shares held by non-state large shareholders. The results are robust after addressing potential endogeneity issues related to the appointment of the board of directors. Additional analysis suggests that the inclusion of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors reduces crash risk by mitigating agency costs, curtailing overinvestment, and improving financial reporting transparency. Collectively, our findings support the notion that the presence of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors strengthens the governance of SOEs.

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政治控制、公司治理和股价崩盘风险：来自中国的证据

我们发现，中国国有企业董事会中有纪委成员的企业股价崩盘风险较低。对于非国有大股东持股较多的国有企业，这种影响不那么明显。在解决了与董事会任命相关的潜在内生性问题后，结果是稳健的。另外的分析表明，在董事会中加入纪律委员会成员可以通过降低代理成本、减少过度投资和提高财务报告透明度来降低崩溃风险。总的来说，我们的研究结果支持这样一种观点，即董事会中纪律委员会成员的存在加强了国有企业的治理。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Emerging Markets Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.10

自引率

4.20%

发文量

审稿时长

100 days

期刊介绍： The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.