Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-14 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005

Oleg Rubanov

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology