Computing agents' reputation within a network

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Federico Grigis , Sergio Ortobelli Lozza , Sebastiano Vitali
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We propose a model of information transmission and reputation building within a social network that exploits portfolio theory and option structures. The network aims to estimate an unknown parameter through multiple communication rounds. At every communication round, estimates of different agents' abilities are shared, avoiding the repetition of information. These estimates are interpreted as financial assets driven by a compound Poisson process. After every communication round, agents construct a fictitious portfolio of options whose underlying is the vector of shared estimates. The portfolio's weights are exploited to aggregate the information received in the communication round. Sufficient conditions for reaching consensus or polarization are provided.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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