Self-control on the path toward artificial moral agency

IF 2.1 3区心理学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Cognitive Systems Research Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.cogsys.2024.101316

Paul Bello, Will Bridewell

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The ability of agents to commit to their plans and see them through is a core concept in the philosophy of action (Bratman, 1987, Holton, 2009) and is considered to be a defining feature of having an intention. Seeing plans through in the face of highly compelling opportunities for action that are incompatible with our current commitments requires self-control. In this review paper, we draw upon ancient and modern literature on self-control along with contemporary ideas about the cognitive architecture supporting intentional action to argue that any computational account of moral agency must include an approach to self-control. In addition, we extract and develop a list of necessary features of the phenomena against which individual modeling efforts can be compared. The ARCADIA cognitive system will be discussed in light of this list of features and used to demonstrate both success and failure in a highly simplified self-control dilemma. Finally, we end by discussing a path toward more functionally complete models of agency and control, along with offering perfunctory thoughts on some of the more conceptually challenging issues to address in the future.

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走向人工道德能动性道路上的自我控制

行为主体对其计划作出承诺并将其贯彻到底的能力是行动哲学中的一个核心概念（Bratman, 1987, Holton, 2009），被认为是具有意图的一个决定性特征。面对与我们目前的承诺不相容的极具吸引力的行动机会，完成计划需要自我控制。在这篇综述文章中，我们借鉴了古代和现代关于自我控制的文献，以及当代关于支持有意行为的认知结构的观点，来论证任何道德行为的计算解释都必须包括自我控制的方法。此外，我们提取并开发了一份现象的必要特征列表，以便对各个建模工作进行比较。ARCADIA认知系统将根据这些特征进行讨论，并用于演示高度简化的自我控制困境中的成功和失败。最后，我们讨论了通往功能更完善的代理和控制模型的道路，并对未来要解决的一些更具概念性挑战的问题提供了一些粗略的想法。

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来源期刊

Cognitive Systems Research 工程技术-计算机：人工智能

CiteScore

9.40

自引率

5.10%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： Cognitive Systems Research is dedicated to the study of human-level cognition. As such, it welcomes papers which advance the understanding, design and applications of cognitive and intelligent systems, both natural and artificial. The journal brings together a broad community studying cognition in its many facets in vivo and in silico, across the developmental spectrum, focusing on individual capacities or on entire architectures. It aims to foster debate and integrate ideas, concepts, constructs, theories, models and techniques from across different disciplines and different perspectives on human-level cognition. The scope of interest includes the study of cognitive capacities and architectures - both brain-inspired and non-brain-inspired - and the application of cognitive systems to real-world problems as far as it offers insights relevant for the understanding of cognition. Cognitive Systems Research therefore welcomes mature and cutting-edge research approaching cognition from a systems-oriented perspective, both theoretical and empirically-informed, in the form of original manuscripts, short communications, opinion articles, systematic reviews, and topical survey articles from the fields of Cognitive Science (including Philosophy of Cognitive Science), Artificial Intelligence/Computer Science, Cognitive Robotics, Developmental Science, Psychology, and Neuroscience and Neuromorphic Engineering. Empirical studies will be considered if they are supplemented by theoretical analyses and contributions to theory development and/or computational modelling studies.