Does shareholder overlap alleviate patent holdup?

IF 7.5 1区管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT

Research Policy Pub Date : 2024-12-31 DOI:10.1016/j.respol.2024.105167

Heng Geng , Harald Hau , Sandy Lai , Pengfei Liu

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Patent protection can generate holdup problems for follow-on innovators when technologies protected in early patents complement their inventions. This study investigates whether institutional shareholder overlap between firms with precursory patents and follow-on innovators can reduce such patent holdup problems. Using patent citation links to track complementary patents, we find empirical support for such a holdup attenuation hypothesis of institutional shareholder overlap. Follow-on innovators with greater institutional shareholder overlap to precursory patent owners enjoy greater success with their patent portfolio, face less patent conflict as measured by patent litigation, and feature higher levels of R&D investments. The holdup attenuation effect is stronger if product complexity makes securing ex ante patent licenses more difficult.

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来源期刊

Research Policy MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

12.80

自引率

6.90%

发文量

182

期刊介绍： Research Policy (RP) articles explore the interaction between innovation, technology, or research, and economic, social, political, and organizational processes, both empirically and theoretically. All RP papers are expected to provide insights with implications for policy or management. Research Policy (RP) is a multidisciplinary journal focused on analyzing, understanding, and effectively addressing the challenges posed by innovation, technology, R&D, and science. This includes activities related to knowledge creation, diffusion, acquisition, and exploitation in the form of new or improved products, processes, or services, across economic, policy, management, organizational, and environmental dimensions.