An Evolutionary Game Study of Consumers' Low-Carbon Travel Behavior Under Carbon-Inclusive Policy

Abstract

Carbon-inclusive policy is regarded as an incentive measure to personal low-carbon actions. However, its impacts are various for different parties under the government-led (including government and consumer) mode and the enterprise-led (including government, consumer and the enterprise) mode, while few studies reveal their difference and give reasonable implications. To fill these gaps, taking consumer's low-carbon travel as an example, this study develops two evolutionary game models—a two-party model (based on government-led adoption) and a tripartite model (based on enterprise-led adoption)—to investigate the effects of carbon-inclusive policy. The findings show that (1) the policy benefits all parties in both models, but the participation of the enterprise enhances the effectiveness of the policy; (2) the enterprise-led mode, that is, the operation of the carbon-inclusive platform by the enterprise is preferred because all parties have higher payoff, compared with the government-led mode; and (3) subsidies from the government has a greater impact for consumers' low-carbon behaviours. However, it has a less impact for the enterprise, which indicates the strategic action of the government is to establish a reasonable consumer subsidy system while reducing subsidies for the enterprise. This study offers a novel perspective on the effects of the carbon-inclusive policy on consumers' low-carbon behaviour, and enriches the practice of personal carbon trading.