Theory-Refuting Findings in Psychology: How Much Should They Matter?

Abstract

To a naïve falsificationist, one theory-refuting finding falsifies a theory. In contrast, sophisticated science philosophers have emphasised larger research systems that include theories and auxiliary assumptions. Theory-refuting findings can be accommodated by blaming poor auxiliary assumptions, refining theories, improving auxiliary assumptions, or pronouncing that the benefits of the research system render theory-refuting findings unimportant. Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan have proposed research systems, with many disagreements between them. The present thesis is that each proposal is subject to two caveats. None of these philosophers sufficiently considered the opportunity costs associated with ignoring theory-refuting findings. Secondly, it is not clear that previous pronouncements about how research systems work in the hard sciences necessarily apply well to modern psychological science. The interaction of these issues suggests that theory-refuting findings may have more potential for mattering in modern psychology than would seem apparent from sophisticated research system perspectives.