{"title":"Government Subsidy Policies for Industrial Internet Adoption: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis","authors":"Xiaoshuai Peng, Shiyi Wang, Cui Zhao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4440","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>Understanding interactions between government, platforms, and enterprises is key to developing the industrial internet ecosystem. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze stakeholder interactions. We examine the equilibrium strategies of stakeholders and the asymptotic stabilities of equilibrium points through theoretical and simulation analyses. The results show that increasing the subsidy coefficient, transaction fee rates for high-level services, and compensation for mismatches incentivize platforms to offer high-level services. Enterprises are motivated to participate in platforms by raising joining profits and lowering transaction fees. For the government, adjusting the subsidy coefficient promotes industrial internet adoption while avoiding excessive subsidies.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1392-1404"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4440","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Understanding interactions between government, platforms, and enterprises is key to developing the industrial internet ecosystem. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze stakeholder interactions. We examine the equilibrium strategies of stakeholders and the asymptotic stabilities of equilibrium points through theoretical and simulation analyses. The results show that increasing the subsidy coefficient, transaction fee rates for high-level services, and compensation for mismatches incentivize platforms to offer high-level services. Enterprises are motivated to participate in platforms by raising joining profits and lowering transaction fees. For the government, adjusting the subsidy coefficient promotes industrial internet adoption while avoiding excessive subsidies.
期刊介绍：
Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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