How bureaucratic competition shapes foreign aid allocation: The case of South Korea's aid agencies

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Taehee Whang, Elena V. McLean, Chamseul Yu
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Abstract

What explains aid allocation–donor interests or recipient needs? This research debate has generated a number of studies, which generally conclude that both motivations matter. One limitation of this literature is that donor governments are conceptualized as unitary actors with coherent preferences. In this study, we relax this assumption and focus on the interests and interactions of bureaucratic agencies within a donor government. We argue that these agencies compete as they seek to control a larger share of the foreign aid budget because foreign aid is a valuable policy instrument for bureaucratic agencies. This competition results in emulation: the agency that leads the government's development cooperation policy emulates other agencies' provision of domestic benefits, while the lead agency's competitors mimic its aid allocation patterns. We test our expectations using data on bilateral aid disbursed by four bureaucratic agencies of the South Korean government and find evidence of both types of emulation strategies. Our results point to the role played by a mostly overlooked group of domestic-level actors in donor countries and the importance of bureaucratic politics and competition.

Abstract Image

官僚竞争如何影响外援分配:韩国援助机构的案例
如何解释援助分配——捐助国的利益还是受援国的需要?这一研究争论产生了许多研究,这些研究普遍得出结论,这两种动机都很重要。本文献的一个局限性是,捐助国政府被概念化为具有一致偏好的单一行为者。在本研究中,我们放宽了这一假设,并将重点放在捐助国政府内部官僚机构的利益和相互作用上。我们认为,这些机构在寻求控制更大份额的外援预算时相互竞争,因为外援对官僚机构来说是一种有价值的政策工具。这种竞争导致了模仿:领导政府发展合作政策的机构模仿其他机构提供国内福利的做法,而领导机构的竞争对手模仿其援助分配模式。我们使用韩国政府的四个官僚机构支付的双边援助数据来测试我们的期望,并找到两种类型的模拟策略的证据。我们的研究结果指出了援助国中一个被忽视的国内行为者群体所发挥的作用,以及官僚政治和竞争的重要性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
109
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to publish the best research on international development issues in a form that is accessible to practitioners and policy-makers as well as to an academic audience. The main focus is on the social sciences - economics, politics, international relations, sociology and anthropology, as well as development studies - but we also welcome articles that blend the natural and social sciences in addressing the challenges for development. The Journal does not represent any particular school, analytical technique or methodological approach, but aims to publish high quality contributions to ideas, frameworks, policy and practice, including in transitional countries and underdeveloped areas of the Global North as well as the Global South.
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