Praxeological Status of Unintentional Speech Acts

Abstract

This paper explores the praxeological status of unintentional speech acts within the framework of speech act theory, examining the role of intention in defining speech acts. It contributes to the debate between internalist and externalist perspectives on whether internal conditions, particularly intentions, are essential for the occurrence of speech acts. The paper draws on praxeology, a methodological approach to studying human action, to argue that speech acts are inherently intentional and purposeful behaviours. It challenges the notion that unintentional acts can be considered speech acts, emphasizing that without intention, there can be no action. The analysis includes a discussion of classical speech act theory, the praxeological concept of action, and the implications of unintentional acts on the theory of communication. The paper concludes that speech acts must be intentional to be considered genuine acts of communication, aligning with the praxeological understanding of human action.