The Paradox of Situated Knowledge: Toward an Existential Embedment Theory of Perceptual Truth

Abstract

Truth is a thorny issue for the sociology of knowledge. In emphasizing social influence on knowledge production, sociologists tend to disavow the objectivity of truth and slide down the slope of the consensus theory and the nihilism of post-truth. In fighting science denial, on the other hand, sociologists often find themselves aligning with the correspondence theory and the naïve notion of naked truth. The aim of this article is to advance a position that recognizes social influence on knowledge attainment without obviating the objectivity in truth. The key to this argument lies in the concept of existential embedment that unifies objectivity and subjectivity in human struggles for survival and prosperity, from which truth originates and to which truth contributes. Existential embedment also anchors knowledge by providing the foundation for truth validation. Depending on the modalities of knowledge attainment, truth is divided into four types with varying degrees of veridical certitude, each having its own criterion for validity assessment. Knowledge that passes the validation test is accepted as truth within the horizon of the given realm of existential embedment, which may change as the existential activity of the knower changes.