Status classification by lottery contests

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Aner Sela
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the optimal design of status classifications in organizational structures under the assumption that agents in a lottery (Tullock) contest care about their relative position. For each such a contest with any number of status categories that is smaller than or equal to the number of agents, we provide sufficient conditions for the optimal partition, which is the distribution of agents among the status categories that maximizes the agents’ symmetric equilibrium effort. We show that, for any number of status categories, in the optimal partition of status categories, the higher the status category, the more agents are included in it. However, in the optimal partition of status categories, a higher status category may not contain more agents than a lower status category when agents receive monetary rewards in addition to the payoff from their relative position (status).
状态分类抽奖比赛
我们研究了组织结构中状态分类的最优设计,假设在彩票竞赛(Tullock)中的主体关心他们的相对位置。对于每一个小于或等于智能体数量的状态类别的竞争,我们提供了最优划分的充分条件,即智能体在状态类别之间的分布,使智能体的对称均衡努力最大化。我们证明了,对于任意数量的状态类别,在状态类别的最优划分中,状态类别越高,包含的智能体越多。然而,在状态类别的最优划分中,当agent除了相对位置(状态)的收益外还获得货币奖励时,较高状态类别所包含的agent数量可能不会比较低状态类别所包含的agent数量多。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
170
期刊介绍: The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
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