Environmental regulation and tax evasion when the regulator has incomplete information

IF 2.6 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Resource and Energy Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101475

Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Laís Ramos

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between an environmental regulator and a polluting firm in a stock pollution Stackelberg game, where the regulator acts as the leader and the firm as the follower. The firm must determine the emissions required for production and pay a tax based on its reported emissions. The regulator chooses this tax on emissions to induce more environmentally respectful behavior of the firm. Evasion, defined as the gap between real and reported emissions can be discouraged using a fine. A central assumption in our analysis is that the regulator has incomplete information regarding the firm’s objective function. The regulator does not know, but conjectures, how afraid the firm is of the fine for fraud. Based on this conjecture, the regulator estimates the firm’s best-response functions and determines the tax. We compare the results when the regulator is accurate or misguided. Interestingly we find that when the regulator overestimates the firm’s fear of the fine for fraud, social welfare can be greater than when he accurately estimates it.

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环境监管与逃税时的监管者信息不完全

本文分析了在存量污染博弈中，环境监管者作为领导者，企业作为追随者，环境监管者与污染企业之间的动态互动。企业必须确定生产所需的排放量，并根据其报告的排放量纳税。监管机构选择这种排放税是为了促使企业采取更尊重环境的行为。逃税，定义为实际排放量和报告排放量之间的差距，可以通过罚款来阻止。我们分析中的一个中心假设是，监管机构对公司的目标函数信息不完全。监管机构不知道，但可以推测，该公司有多害怕因欺诈而被罚款。基于这一猜想，监管机构估计公司的最佳反应函数并确定税收。当调节器准确或被误导时，我们比较结果。有趣的是，我们发现，当监管者高估公司对欺诈罚款的恐惧时，社会福利可能比他准确估计时更大。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Resource and Energy Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

5.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.