Fratricidal Coercion in Modern War

IF 8.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Jason Lyall, Yuri Zhukov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Armies sometimes use fratricidal coercion—violence and intimidation against their own troops—to force reluctant soldiers to fight. How this practice affects battlefield performance remains an open question. We study fratricidal coercion using a mixed-methods strategy, drawing on (1) monthly panel data on Soviet Rifle Divisions in World War II, built from millions of declassified personnel files; (2) paired comparisons of Rifle Divisions at the Battle of Leningrad; and (3) cross-national data on 526 land battles and war outcomes from 75 conflicts (1939–2011) to assess generalizability. We offer three sets of empirical findings. First, coercion keeps some soldiers from fleeing the battlefield, but at the cost of higher casualties and reduced initiative. Second, wartime and prewar coercion (such as mass repression and officer purges) affect soldiers’ behavior in similar, mutually reinforcing ways. Third, the resolve-boosting, initiative-dampening effects of fratricidal coercion generalize across belligerents and wars. Fratricidal coercion generates compliance through fear, compelling soldiers with variable levels of resolve to conform to a uniform standard of battlefield behavior. But the net utility of this approach is dubious. On balance, countries employing fratricidal coercion are less likely to win wars.

现代战争中的自相残杀
军队有时会对自己的部队使用自相残杀的强制手段——暴力和恐吓——迫使不情愿的士兵参战。这种做法如何影响战场性能仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。我们使用一种混合方法的策略来研究自相残杀的胁迫,借鉴了:(1)二战期间苏联步枪师的月度面板数据,这些数据来自数百万份解密的人事档案;(2)列宁格勒战役中各步兵师的成对比较;(3)利用1939-2011年间526次陆战的跨国数据和75次冲突的战争结果来评估概括性。我们提供了三组实证研究结果。首先,强制使一些士兵避免逃离战场,但代价是更高的伤亡和主动性的降低。其次,战时和战前的胁迫(如大规模镇压和军官清洗)以类似的、相互加强的方式影响着士兵的行为。第三,在所有交战国和战争中,同类相杀的胁迫都具有增强决心、抑制主动的作用。自相残杀的强迫通过恐惧产生顺从,迫使士兵以不同程度的决心遵守战场行为的统一标准。但这种方法的实际效用令人怀疑。总的来说,采用自相残杀式胁迫的国家赢得战争的可能性更小。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.50
自引率
1.30%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: International Organization (IO) is a prominent peer-reviewed journal that comprehensively covers the field of international affairs. Its subject areas encompass foreign policies, international relations, political economy, security policies, environmental disputes, regional integration, alliance patterns, conflict resolution, economic development, and international capital movements. Continuously ranked among the top journals in the field, IO does not publish book reviews but instead features high-quality review essays that survey new developments, synthesize important ideas, and address key issues for future scholarship.
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