The Delusional Hedge Algorithm as a Model of Human Learning From Diverse Opinions.

IF 3 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Topics in Cognitive Science Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-27 DOI:10.1111/tops.12783
Yun-Shiuan Chuang, Xiaojin Zhu, Timothy T Rogers
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Whereas cognitive models of learning often assume direct experience with both the features of an event and with a true label or outcome, much of everyday learning arises from hearing the opinions of others, without direct access to either the experience or the ground-truth outcome. We consider how people can learn which opinions to trust in such scenarios by extending the hedge algorithm: a classic solution for learning from diverse information sources. We first introduce a semi-supervised variant we call the delusional hedge capable of learning from both supervised and unsupervised experiences. In two experiments, we examine the alignment between human judgments and predictions from the standard hedge, the delusional hedge, and a heuristic baseline model. Results indicate that humans effectively incorporate both labeled and unlabeled information in a manner consistent with the delusional hedge algorithm-suggesting that human learners not only gauge the accuracy of information sources but also their consistency with other reliable sources. The findings advance our understanding of human learning from diverse opinions, with implications for the development of algorithms that better capture how people learn to weigh conflicting information sources.

Abstract Image

Abstract Image

Abstract Image

作为人类从不同观点中学习模型的错觉对冲算法。
虽然学习的认知模型通常假设对事件的特征和真实的标签或结果都有直接的经验,但许多日常学习来自于听取他人的意见,而不是直接获得经验或基本事实的结果。我们考虑人们如何通过扩展对冲算法(从不同信息源学习的经典解决方案)来学习在这种情况下信任哪些意见。我们首先引入一种半监督的变体,我们称之为妄想对冲,能够从监督和无监督的经验中学习。在两个实验中,我们从标准对冲、妄想对冲和启发式基线模型中检验了人类判断与预测之间的一致性。结果表明,人类以一种与妄想对冲算法一致的方式有效地吸收了标记和未标记的信息,这表明人类学习者不仅衡量信息源的准确性,而且还衡量它们与其他可靠来源的一致性。这些发现促进了我们对人类从不同观点中学习的理解,对更好地捕捉人们如何学会权衡相互冲突的信息来源的算法的开发具有启示意义。
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来源期刊
Topics in Cognitive Science
Topics in Cognitive Science PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
8.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
52
期刊介绍: Topics in Cognitive Science (topiCS) is an innovative new journal that covers all areas of cognitive science including cognitive modeling, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive anthropology, and cognitive science and philosophy. topiCS aims to provide a forum for: -New communities of researchers- New controversies in established areas- Debates and commentaries- Reflections and integration The publication features multiple scholarly papers dedicated to a single topic. Some of these topics will appear together in one issue, but others may appear across several issues or develop into a regular feature. Controversies or debates started in one issue may be followed up by commentaries in a later issue, etc. However, the format and origin of the topics will vary greatly.
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