Si Substrate Backside—An Emerging Physical Attack Surface for Secure ICs in Flip Chip Packaging

Makoto Nagata;Takuji Miki
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Abstract

Semiconductor integrated circuit (IC) chips are regularly exposed to physical attacks and faced to the compromise of information security. An attacker leverages Si substrate backside as the open surface of an IC chip in flip-chip packaging and explores the points of information leakage over the entire backside without being hampered by physical obstacles as well as applying invasive treatments. Physical side channels (SCs), e.g., voltage potentials, current flows, electromagnetic (EM) waves, and photons, are transparent through Si substrate and attributed to the operation of security ICs. An attacker measures SCs using probes as well as antennas and correlates them with secret information, such as secret key bytes, used in a cryptographic processor or analog quantities at the frontend of Internet of Things (IoT) gadgets. This article defines and elucidates the emerging threats of Si-substrate backside attacks on flipped IC chips, demonstrates attacks and proposes countermeasures.
硅衬底背面——倒装封装中安全集成电路的新兴物理攻击面
半导体集成电路(IC)芯片经常受到物理攻击,面临信息安全的威胁。攻击者利用硅衬底背面作为倒装芯片封装中IC芯片的开放表面,在不受物理障碍阻碍的情况下探索整个背面的信息泄漏点,并应用侵入性治疗。物理侧通道(sc),如电压电位、电流、电磁波和光子,通过Si衬底是透明的,并归因于安全ic的操作。攻击者使用探针和天线测量SCs,并将其与秘密信息(如加密处理器中使用的秘密密钥字节或物联网(IoT)设备前端的模拟量)相关联。本文定义并阐述了硅衬底背面攻击对翻转IC芯片的新威胁,演示了攻击并提出了对策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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