Moral-dilemma judgments by individuals and groups: Are many heads really more utilitarian than one?

Abstract

Moral dilemmas often involve a conflict between action-options that maximize outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) and inaction-options that conform to moral norms (deontology). Previous research suggests that, compared to individuals, groups show stronger support for outcome-maximizing actions that violate moral norms. The current study used a computational modeling approach to investigate whether this difference is driven by (1) stronger sensitivity to consequences, (2) weaker sensitivity to moral norms, or (3) weaker action aversion in moral-dilemma judgments made by groups. The results suggest that groups show a stronger sensitivity to consequences than individuals. Groups and individuals did not differ in terms of their sensitivity to moral norms and their general action aversion. The findings challenge the idea that groups are less action averse and less concerned about violating moral norms than individuals and instead suggest that group decisions are more strongly guided by outcomes for the greater good.