Retailer information sharing under manufacturer encroachment and production cost reduction

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI:10.1002/mde.4395

Zhibao Li, Beifen Wang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates retailer's sharing decisions concerning ex ante information about demand when the encroaching manufacturer can reduce production cost. Equilibrium information sharing decisions with encroachment are quite different from that with no encroachment. The encroaching manufacturer's cost reduction efficiency is key to determine equilibrium results, and these thresholds regarding cost reduction efficiency depend on competition intensity between the encroaching manufacturer's direct channel and retailer channel. Furthermore, through investigating the encroachment decisions of the manufacturer, we prove that the equilibrium information sharing decisions under encroachment is robust in general.

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厂商侵占下的零售商信息共享与降低生产成本

本研究探讨了当制造商的入侵可以降低生产成本时，零售商的事前需求资讯共享决策。有侵犯的均衡信息共享决策与无侵犯的均衡信息共享决策有很大不同。入侵厂商的成本降低效率是决定均衡结果的关键，而成本降低效率的阈值取决于入侵厂商直销渠道与零售商渠道之间的竞争强度。此外，通过研究制造商的入侵决策，我们证明了在入侵下的均衡信息共享决策一般是鲁棒的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.