Elections, coalitions, and the politics of Brazil's macroeconomic stabilization

IF 1.4 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Politics & Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI:10.1111/polp.12637

Daniel H. Alves

{"title":"Elections, coalitions, and the politics of Brazil's macroeconomic stabilization","authors":"Daniel H. Alves","doi":"10.1111/polp.12637","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <p>After several failed attempts in previous years, Brazil's Plano Real finally ended hyperinflation in 1993–1994, and a significant driver of inequality and poverty was eliminated as a result. By combining data from Congress and newspaper archives, 17 interviews, and secondary sources, this article takes a qualitative approach to explore the notion that increased electoral competition and effective coalition management enabled price stabilization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), the economy minister leading the plan and the winner of the 1994 presidential election, campaigned as the anti-inflation candidate, promising newly enfranchised low-income voters that reining in prices would boost their earnings. Meanwhile, the minoritarian executive took advantage of coalitional tools to cultivate legislative alliances and approve the plan's measures. For analytical generalization, a potential model is proposed for further investigations on the relationship between competitive elections, cross-party cooperation, and price stability in nine other country cases within and outside Latin America.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Related Articles</h3>\n \n <p>Adegboye, Alex, Kofo Adegboye, Uwalomwa Uwuigbe, Stephen Ojeka, and Eyitemi Fasanu. 2023. “Taxation, Democracy, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Relevant Linkages for Sustainable Development Goals.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 51(4): 696–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12547.</p>\n \n <p>Segatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 46(3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252.</p>\n \n <p>Zimerman, Artur, and Flávio Pinheiro. 2020. “Appearances Can be Deceptive: Political Polarisation, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 48(2): 339–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":51679,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Policy","volume":"52 6","pages":"1227-1245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/polp.12637","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12637","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

After several failed attempts in previous years, Brazil's Plano Real finally ended hyperinflation in 1993–1994, and a significant driver of inequality and poverty was eliminated as a result. By combining data from Congress and newspaper archives, 17 interviews, and secondary sources, this article takes a qualitative approach to explore the notion that increased electoral competition and effective coalition management enabled price stabilization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), the economy minister leading the plan and the winner of the 1994 presidential election, campaigned as the anti-inflation candidate, promising newly enfranchised low-income voters that reining in prices would boost their earnings. Meanwhile, the minoritarian executive took advantage of coalitional tools to cultivate legislative alliances and approve the plan's measures. For analytical generalization, a potential model is proposed for further investigations on the relationship between competitive elections, cross-party cooperation, and price stability in nine other country cases within and outside Latin America.

Adegboye, Alex, Kofo Adegboye, Uwalomwa Uwuigbe, Stephen Ojeka, and Eyitemi Fasanu. 2023. “Taxation, Democracy, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Relevant Linkages for Sustainable Development Goals.” Politics & Policy 51(4): 696–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12547.

Segatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 46(3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252.

Zimerman, Artur, and Flávio Pinheiro. 2020. “Appearances Can be Deceptive: Political Polarisation, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 48(2): 339–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345.

查看原文本刊更多论文

选举、联盟和巴西宏观经济稳定的政治

在前几年的几次失败尝试之后，巴西的“雷亚尔计划”（Plano Real）终于在1993年至1994年结束了恶性通货膨胀，从而消除了造成不平等和贫困的一个重要因素。通过结合来自国会和报纸档案、17次访谈和二手资料的数据，本文采用定性方法来探讨增加选举竞争和有效的联盟管理使价格稳定的概念。领导该计划的经济部长、1994年总统大选的获胜者费尔南多•恩里克•卡多佐（Fernando Henrique Cardoso）在竞选中作为反通胀候选人，向新近获得选举权的低收入选民承诺，控制物价将提高他们的收入。与此同时，少数族裔的行政部门利用联盟工具来培养立法联盟，并批准了该计划的措施。为了分析概括，提出了一个潜在的模型，用于进一步调查拉丁美洲内外其他九个国家的竞争性选举、跨党派合作和价格稳定之间的关系。相关文章阿德博耶，亚历克斯，阿德博耶，乌瓦洛姆瓦·乌维格贝，斯蒂芬·奥耶卡和埃伊特米·法萨努。2023。“撒哈拉以南非洲的税收、民主和不平等：可持续发展目标的相关联系。”政治,政策51(4):696-722。https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12547。塞加托，卡塔琳娜·伊安尼和丹尼尔·巴姆兰。2018. 党派之界限：联邦制，官僚的角色，以及巴西全民医疗覆盖之路。政治,政策46(3):416-41。https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252。齐默尔曼、阿图尔和Flávio皮涅罗，2020。“外表可能具有欺骗性：巴西的政治两极分化、农业政策和联合总统主义”。政治,政策48(2):339-71。https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Politics & Policy POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量