Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI:10.1002/mde.4367

Yuqi Yang, Tianle Meng

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the relationship between excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) and financing constraints (FCs) using 2008–2021 data for listed family firms in China. We find that ECFBS intensifies Type II agency problems, thereby worsens corporate FCs. We also investigate the impact of family firm founder characteristics, family owner characteristics, and external shareholder equity structure on the ECFBS and FCs. Our findings provide evidence of the encroachment effect of family control.

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.