Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with greening efforts.

IF 8 2区 环境科学与生态学 Q1 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
Journal of Environmental Management Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-17 DOI:10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.123626
Abdul Quadir, Alok Raj, Cyril R H Foropon
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Abstract

This study considers a supply chain model wherein the retailers have private information about demand and the manufacturers undertake greening efforts. First, we consider a base model with one manufacturer and retailer to analyze the manufacturer's greening decisions under demand information sharing. Then, we extend the model by considering two competing supply chains, each comprising one manufacturer and one retailer. Using game theory, we examine the greening decisions and impacts of competition on the supply chain, considering both Cournot (quantity) and Bertrand (price) competition. Our results suggest that information sharing improves the greening level on the one hand and distorts the wholesale price upward in response to an accurate demand signal on the other hand. We show that information sharing is most likely to occur if the manufacturer is efficient in greening efforts in both Cournot and Bertrand competition. We find that (a) Bertrand (Cournot) competition with information sharing leads to higher (lower) equilibrium greening levels in the supply chain; (b) The equilibrium greening level of the products decreases in Cournot while increases in Bertrand competition; (c) The equilibrium greening level is higher in Bertrand than Cournot under information sharing. Past literature on information sharing suggests that full information sharing reduces consumer surplus and social welfare. Contrary to this result, we show that it depends on competition mode. With intense competition, consumer surplus and social welfare are higher in Bertrand competition in full information sharing than in no information sharing. Our results provide novel insights into how the mode of competition impacts the greening effort by sharing demand information in competing supply chains.

在竞争的供应链中共享需求信息,实现绿色发展。
本研究考虑一个供应链模型,其中零售商拥有关于需求的私人信息,制造商承担绿色努力。首先,考虑一个制造商和零售商的基本模型,分析需求信息共享条件下制造商的绿色决策。然后,我们通过考虑两个竞争的供应链来扩展模型,每个供应链包括一个制造商和一个零售商。利用博弈论,我们考察了绿色决策和竞争对供应链的影响,同时考虑了古诺(数量)和贝特朗(价格)竞争。研究结果表明,信息共享一方面提高了绿色水平,另一方面扭曲了批发价格,以响应准确的需求信号。我们发现,在古诺竞争和贝特朗竞争中,如果制造商在绿化方面的努力是有效的,那么信息共享最有可能发生。我们发现(a)具有信息共享的贝特朗(古诺)竞争导致供应链中更高(更低)的平衡绿化水平;(b)古诺地区产品的平衡绿化水平下降,而贝特朗竞争增加;(c)在信息共享条件下,贝特朗的平衡绿化水平高于古诺。以往关于信息共享的文献表明,充分的信息共享降低了消费者剩余和社会福利。与此相反,我们证明了这取决于竞争模式。在竞争激烈的情况下,完全信息共享的Bertrand竞争中消费者剩余和社会福利高于无信息共享的Bertrand竞争。我们的研究结果为竞争模式如何通过在竞争供应链中共享需求信息来影响绿色努力提供了新的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Environmental Management
Journal of Environmental Management 环境科学-环境科学
CiteScore
13.70
自引率
5.70%
发文量
2477
审稿时长
84 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Management is a journal for the publication of peer reviewed, original research for all aspects of management and the managed use of the environment, both natural and man-made.Critical review articles are also welcome; submission of these is strongly encouraged.
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