{"title":"Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation","authors":"Yan He;Yumin Su;Kaiyuan Yang","doi":"10.1109/JSSC.2024.3504546","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip’s operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of <inline-formula> <tex-math>$1500~{\\mu }$ </tex-math></inline-formula>m2. It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature.","PeriodicalId":13129,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal of Solid-state Circuits","volume":"60 1","pages":"146-157"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Journal of Solid-state Circuits","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10777000/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip’s operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of $1500~{\mu }$ m2. It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits publishes papers each month in the broad area of solid-state circuits with particular emphasis on transistor-level design of integrated circuits. It also provides coverage of topics such as circuits modeling, technology, systems design, layout, and testing that relate directly to IC design. Integrated circuits and VLSI are of principal interest; material related to discrete circuit design is seldom published. Experimental verification is strongly encouraged.