The impact of CEO contract duration on corporate misconduct

IF 10.5 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Journal of Business Research Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2024.115110

Yang Yang, Mingyang Zou

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

CEOs play a crucial role in mitigating organisational misconduct. However, previous studies have mainly focused on the CEO characteristics that help firms choose an appropriate CEOs. Less is known about how to manage risk through contract design when appointing a chief executive to reduce misconduct. This study examines how CEO contract duration affects the likelihood of corporate misconduct. We bridge agency and upper echelon theories to hypothesise the impact of CEO contract duration on corporate misconduct. We also examine how CEO compensation and firm ownership concentration moderate this relationship. Using data collected from multiple sources, we analyse the impact of CEO contract duration on corporate misconduct in listed companies from 1994 to 2022. The results show a U-shaped relationship between CEO contract duration and misconduct. Initially, misconduct decreases with longer CEO contracts but begins to increase as the duration extends further. This relationship is strengthened when CEO compensation and ownership concentration decrease. We also investigate the relationship between CEO succession contract duration and the actual tenure situation, and the results are generally consistent with our hypothesis. Overall, CEO succession contract duration at an intermediate level is more effective in reducing corporate misconduct than other contract durations. Our conclusions contribute to the research on the relationship between CEO contract design and corporate misconduct.

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CEO合同期限对企业不当行为的影响

首席执行官在减轻组织不当行为方面发挥着至关重要的作用。然而，以往的研究主要集中在帮助企业选择合适CEO的CEO特征上。在任命首席执行官以减少不当行为时，人们对如何通过合同设计来管理风险知之甚少。本研究探讨CEO合约期限如何影响公司不当行为的可能性。我们将代理理论和上层理论结合起来，假设CEO合同期限对公司不当行为的影响。我们还研究了CEO薪酬和公司股权集中度如何调节这种关系。本文利用多种渠道收集的数据，分析了1994 - 2022年间上市公司CEO合同期限对公司不当行为的影响。结果表明，CEO契约期限与不当行为之间呈u型关系。最初，不当行为随着CEO合同的延长而减少，但随着任期的进一步延长，不当行为开始增加。当CEO薪酬和股权集中度降低时，这种关系得到加强。我们还研究了CEO继任合同期限与实际任期情况的关系，结果与我们的假设基本一致。总体而言，中级水平的CEO继任合同期限比其他合同期限更有效地减少了公司的不当行为。本文的研究结果为CEO契约设计与企业不当行为之间的关系研究提供了理论依据。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Business Research BUSINESS-

CiteScore

20.30

自引率

10.60%

发文量

956

期刊介绍： The Journal of Business Research aims to publish research that is rigorous, relevant, and potentially impactful. It examines a wide variety of business decision contexts, processes, and activities, developing insights that are meaningful for theory, practice, and/or society at large. The research is intended to generate meaningful debates in academia and practice, that are thought provoking and have the potential to make a difference to conceptual thinking and/or practice. The Journal is published for a broad range of stakeholders, including scholars, researchers, executives, and policy makers. It aids the application of its research to practical situations and theoretical findings to the reality of the business world as well as to society. The Journal is abstracted and indexed in several databases, including Social Sciences Citation Index, ANBAR, Current Contents, Management Contents, Management Literature in Brief, PsycINFO, Information Service, RePEc, Academic Journal Guide, ABI/Inform, INSPEC, etc.