On the incentive properties of revenue cap regulation

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.108052

Dennis L. Weisman

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Revenue cap regulation (RCR) is increasingly common in the energy sector because it purportedly reduces the regulated firm's disincentive to promote conservation. In comparison with price-cap regulation, RCR can yield higher prices, greater energy conservation, lower service quality and decreased cost-reducing innovation. The distortionary effects of earnings sharing on investment in cost-reducing innovation may be lessened under RCR. These properties hold even when the regulated firm is further constrained with a price cap that is set equal to the minimum price that satisfies the RCR constraint.

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.