Are women blamed more for giving incorrect financial advice?

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106781

Martin Abel, Emma Bomfim, Izzy Cisneros, Jackson Coyle, Song Eraou, Martha Gebeyehu, Gerardo Hernandez, Julian Juantorena, Lizzy Kaplan, Danielle Marquez, Jack Mullen, Peyton Mulhern, Ayana Opong-Nyantekyi, Rin Osathanugrah, Joe Paul, Austin Philie, Luke Tingley, Jingyi Wang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We conduct an incentivized experiment with a nationally representative sample to investigate gender discrimination among people receiving advice on risky investments. Participants learn about actual start-up firms they can invest in. Before deciding how much of their endowment to invest, they receive recommendations from either female or male professionals. We find that before outcomes are revealed, participants are equally likely to follow recommendations of female and male advisors. Likewise, we observe no gender discrimination following advice that proves correct. However, for advice that turns out to be incorrect, advisor gender significantly impacts the decisions made by male participants. They invest 47% less in the direction of this advice compared to situations where male advisors were incorrect. These differences are not explained by participants’ stated views on gender roles and advisors’ ability as well as the level of attention towards female advisors.

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女性是否因提供不正确的财务建议而受到更多指责？

我们以具有全国代表性的样本为对象，开展了一项激励实验，以调查在接受风险投资建议的人群中存在的性别歧视。参与者了解他们可以投资的实际创业公司。在决定投资多少资金之前，他们会接受女性或男性专业人士的建议。我们发现，在结果揭晓之前，参与者同样可能听从女性和男性顾问的建议。同样，我们也观察到，在建议被证明是正确的情况下，没有性别歧视。然而，对于被证明是错误的建议，顾问的性别对男性参与者的决策产生了显著影响。与男性顾问的建议不正确的情况相比，他们在该建议方向上的投资减少了 47%。参与者对性别角色和顾问能力的看法以及对女性顾问的关注程度并不能解释这些差异。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.