People reward others based on their willingness to exert effort

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Yang Xiang , Jenna Landy , Fiery A. Cushman , Natalia Vélez , Samuel J. Gershman
{"title":"People reward others based on their willingness to exert effort","authors":"Yang Xiang ,&nbsp;Jenna Landy ,&nbsp;Fiery A. Cushman ,&nbsp;Natalia Vélez ,&nbsp;Samuel J. Gershman","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104699","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Individual contributors to a collaborative task are often rewarded for going above and beyond—salespeople earn commissions, athletes earn performance bonuses, and companies award special parking spots to their employee of the month. How do we decide when to reward collaborators, and are these decisions closely aligned with how responsible they were for the outcome of a collaboration? In Experiments 1a and 1b (<span><math><mi>N</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>360</mn></math></span>), we tested how participants give bonuses, using stimuli and an experiment design that has previously been used to elicit responsibility judgments (<span><span>Xiang et al., 2023a</span></span>). Past work has found that responsibility judgments are driven both by how much effort people actually contributed and how much they could have contributed (<span><span>Xiang et al., 2023a</span></span>). In contrast, here we found that participants allocated bonuses based <em>only</em> on how much effort agents actually contributed. In Experiments 2a and 2b (<span><math><mi>N</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>358</mn></math></span>), we introduced agents who were instructed to exert a particular level of effort; participants still rewarded effort, but their rewards were more sensitive to the precise level of effort exerted when the agents decided how much effort to exert. Together, these findings suggest that people reward collaborators based on their <em>willingness</em> to exert effort, and point to a difference between decisions about how to assign responsibility to collaborators and how to incentivize them. One possible explanation for this difference is that responsibility judgments may reflect causal inference about past collaborations, whereas providing incentives may motivate collaborators to keep exerting effort in the future. Our work sheds light on the cognitive capacities that underlie collaboration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 104699"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124001124","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Individual contributors to a collaborative task are often rewarded for going above and beyond—salespeople earn commissions, athletes earn performance bonuses, and companies award special parking spots to their employee of the month. How do we decide when to reward collaborators, and are these decisions closely aligned with how responsible they were for the outcome of a collaboration? In Experiments 1a and 1b (N=360), we tested how participants give bonuses, using stimuli and an experiment design that has previously been used to elicit responsibility judgments (Xiang et al., 2023a). Past work has found that responsibility judgments are driven both by how much effort people actually contributed and how much they could have contributed (Xiang et al., 2023a). In contrast, here we found that participants allocated bonuses based only on how much effort agents actually contributed. In Experiments 2a and 2b (N=358), we introduced agents who were instructed to exert a particular level of effort; participants still rewarded effort, but their rewards were more sensitive to the precise level of effort exerted when the agents decided how much effort to exert. Together, these findings suggest that people reward collaborators based on their willingness to exert effort, and point to a difference between decisions about how to assign responsibility to collaborators and how to incentivize them. One possible explanation for this difference is that responsibility judgments may reflect causal inference about past collaborations, whereas providing incentives may motivate collaborators to keep exerting effort in the future. Our work sheds light on the cognitive capacities that underlie collaboration.
人们根据他人付出努力的意愿给予奖励
对合作任务做出贡献的个人往往会获得超额奖励--销售人员会获得佣金,运动员会获得绩效奖金,公司也会为月度优秀员工提供特别停车位。我们如何决定何时奖励合作者,这些决定是否与合作者对合作结果的责任密切相关?在实验 1a 和 1b(N=360)中,我们使用了以前用于诱发责任判断的刺激和实验设计(Xiang 等人,2023a),测试了参与者如何发放奖金。过去的研究发现,责任判断既受人们实际付出多少努力的驱动,也受他们本可以付出多少努力的驱动(Xiang 等人,2023a)。与此相反,我们发现参与者只根据代理人实际付出的努力来分配奖金。在实验 2a 和 2b(N=358)中,我们引入了被指示付出特定努力水平的代理人;参与者仍然奖励付出的努力,但当代理人决定付出多少努力时,他们的奖励对付出努力的精确水平更加敏感。这些发现共同表明,人们会根据合作者付出努力的意愿给予奖励,并指出了如何分配合作者的责任与如何激励合作者的决策之间的差异。对这种差异的一种可能解释是,责任判断可能反映了对过去合作的因果推断,而提供奖励则可能激励合作者在未来继续努力。我们的研究揭示了合作的认知能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信