Environmental supervision distance, government-enterprise collusion and corporate environmental information disclosure

IF 4.8 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

International Review of Economics & Finance Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.iref.2024.103710

Bin Wang , Yonghong Ma , Beier Luo , Daqian Shi , Shan Jiang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Based on the framework of government-enterprise collusion and proactive government regulation, this study examines the impact of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory distance on corporate environmental information disclosure (EID) using data from listed companies in China from 2009 to 2021. The results of the study show that: (1) The closer the geographical distance between the local EPA and the company, the poorer the quality, which verifies the collusion effect. Our results are robust after a series of robustness checks. (2) The collusion effect of geographical distance primarily works by enhancing the ability of companies to seek environmental protection. (3) The impact is greater when the sample company belongs to non-sub-provincial municipal, pollution industry, state-owned, large-scale, and mature enterprises. (4) The central environmental inspections and media attention can alleviate the collusion effect of environmental regulatory distance. This study provides new empirical evidence for the " distance decay effect " in geo-economics and offers new insights from the perspective of geo-economics for measuring government-enterprise collusion.

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环境监管距离、政企合谋与企业环境信息披露

本研究基于政企合谋和政府主动监管的框架，利用 2009 年至 2021 年中国上市公司的数据，研究了环境保护局（EPA）监管距离对企业环境信息披露（EID）的影响。研究结果表明(1）地方环保局与企业的地理距离越近，信息质量越差，这验证了串通效应。经过一系列稳健性检验，我们的结果是稳健的。(2）地理距离的合谋效应主要通过提高企业寻求环境保护的能力来发挥作用。(3）当样本企业属于非副省级城市、污染行业、国有企业、大型企业和成熟企业时，其影响更大。(4）中央环保督查和媒体关注可以缓解环境监管距离的合谋效应。本研究为地缘经济学中的 "距离衰减效应 "提供了新的实证证据，并从地缘经济学的角度为衡量政企合谋提供了新的启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Review of Economics & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

2.20%

发文量

253

期刊介绍： The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.