CEO turnover and director reputation

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-23 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103971

Felix von Meyerinck , Jonas Romer , Markus Schmid

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.

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首席执行官更替和董事声誉

本文分析了首席执行官被迫离职对外部董事声誉的影响。我们发现，与首席执行官被迫离职有关联的董事，在随后的重新选举中，相对于没有离职关联的董事，所投的反对票会大幅持续增加。董事们并不会因为参与人员更替本身而受到惩罚，而是会因为与董事会治理失误相关的 CEO 被迫离职而受到惩罚。我们的研究结果对普遍认为迫使首席执行官离职通常可以理解为公司治理运作良好的标志这一观点提出了质疑。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.