Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence

Abstract

We analyze the effects of only shifting the statutory incidence of taxes by exploiting: (i) a mortgage tax shift from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks, without tax rate changes; (ii) some areas –for historical reasons– being tax-exempt (or having different tax rates); and (iii) administrative data. After the shift, the average mortgage rate increases, less for households with more banking opportunities or with higher income. The tax pass-through is nonexistent for high-income households, but complete for low-income households. Consistently, banks’ risk-taking increases, especially by more policy-affected banks. Results are consistent with a model in which all borrowers have tax saliency issues and differ in their bargaining power vis-à-vis the lender. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the irrelevance of statutory incidence and suggests unintended consequences on inequality and banks’ risk-taking.