The social value of overreaction to information

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103067

Matteo Bizzarri , Daniele d’Arienzo

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the welfare effects of overreaction to information in markets with asymmetric information as well as the impact of a simple intervention in the form of a tax or a subsidy on trade volume. A large enough level of overreaction is always welfare decreasing: in these situations, introducing a tax can improve welfare. However, a small degree of overreaction can increase welfare. This is because of the interplay of two competing externalities: an information externality, due to the informational role of prices, and a pecuniary externality, due to the allocative role of prices. Depending on the balance of these externalities, a trade volume subsidy may be optimal.

查看原文本刊更多论文

对信息反应过度的社会价值

我们研究了信息不对称市场中对信息过度反应的福利效应，以及以税收或补贴形式进行简单干预对交易量的影响。过度反应的程度越大，福利越低：在这种情况下，征税可以提高福利。然而，较小程度的过度反应也会增加福利。这是因为存在两种相互竞争的外部性：一种是由于价格的信息作用而产生的信息外部性，另一种是由于价格的分配作用而产生的金钱外部性。根据这些外部性的平衡，贸易量补贴可能是最优的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.