The Limits of Formalism in the Separation of Powers

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Shalev Gad Roisman
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Abstract

Formalism is the dominant mode of separation of powers analysis on the Supreme Court and one of two paradigmatic approaches in the academy. It seeks to resolve disputes between Congress and the President by asking which branch has exclusive power over the relevant matter. This method is thought to work because, if one branch has exclusive power over the matter, then, by definition, the other branch does not. Although this method is coherent and workable in some relatively straightforward cases, it is of no use in areas where both branches’ “exclusive” powers overlap—as formalists routinely concede is possible. This is a major problem because almost all the disputes that actually arise today involve areas of overlapping power. In such cases, both branches have relevant power to act and come into conflict. This Article argues that separation of powers formalism has never built—and can never build—a coherent method that tells us which branch to prioritize in such instances. These are the limits of formalism in the separation of powers. Formalism might help us understand some uncontroversial separation of powers questions, but it cannot resolve the disputes that actually matter today.
分权中形式主义的局限性
形式主义是最高法院三权分立分析的主要模式,也是学术界两种典型方法之一。它试图通过询问哪个部门对相关事项拥有专属权力来解决国会与总统之间的争议。这种方法被认为行之有效,因为如果一个部门对相关事项拥有专属权,那么根据定义,另一个部门就没有专属权。虽然这种方法在一些相对简单的情况下是连贯和可行的,但在两个部门的 "专属 "权力重叠的领域却毫无用处--形式主义者通常承认这是可能的。这是一个大问题,因为当今实际出现的几乎所有争端都涉及权力重叠的领域。在这种情况下,两个部门都有相关的行动权,并发生冲突。本文认为,三权分立的形式主义从未建立--也不可能建立--一种连贯的方法,告诉我们在这种情况下应优先考虑哪个部门。这就是形式主义在三权分立中的局限。形式主义可能会帮助我们理解一些没有争议的分权问题,但它无法解决当今实际重要的争端。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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