{"title":"Who should provide a trade-in service under the online agency-selling mode?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.elerap.2024.101454","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In real world practice, trade-in programs are offered by either a manufacturer or an e-commerce platform. Parties that offer a trade-in service are faced with a trade-off between trade-in rebates and the residual income. By adopting the game theory, this paper explored the selection of trade-in provider with respect to a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform. The results show that in some cases, all trade-in models generated higher manufacturing costs than models with no trade-in program. However, in other cases, not all trade-in models can cope with manufacturing costs that are higher than those associated with models that have no trade-in program. Furthermore, both above two firms will offer the trade-ins when profits which they have obtained satisfied a certain condition. We also identified an interesting phenomenon whereby the manufacturer decided whether it wanted to delegate the trade-ins to the e-commerce platform or provide it jointly. The e-commerce platform can decide whether it wants to accept the delegation or jointly offer it. This study also obtain that trade-in models makes customers get more surplus and can produce greater environmental benefits. Moreover, both the customer surplus and the environmental benefits in delegated trade-in model is the same that in jointly trade-in model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50541,"journal":{"name":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567422324000991","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In real world practice, trade-in programs are offered by either a manufacturer or an e-commerce platform. Parties that offer a trade-in service are faced with a trade-off between trade-in rebates and the residual income. By adopting the game theory, this paper explored the selection of trade-in provider with respect to a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform. The results show that in some cases, all trade-in models generated higher manufacturing costs than models with no trade-in program. However, in other cases, not all trade-in models can cope with manufacturing costs that are higher than those associated with models that have no trade-in program. Furthermore, both above two firms will offer the trade-ins when profits which they have obtained satisfied a certain condition. We also identified an interesting phenomenon whereby the manufacturer decided whether it wanted to delegate the trade-ins to the e-commerce platform or provide it jointly. The e-commerce platform can decide whether it wants to accept the delegation or jointly offer it. This study also obtain that trade-in models makes customers get more surplus and can produce greater environmental benefits. Moreover, both the customer surplus and the environmental benefits in delegated trade-in model is the same that in jointly trade-in model.
期刊介绍:
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications aims to create and disseminate enduring knowledge for the fast-changing e-commerce environment. A major dilemma in e-commerce research is how to achieve a balance between the currency and the life span of knowledge.
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications will contribute to the establishment of a research community to create the knowledge, technology, theory, and applications for the development of electronic commerce. This is targeted at the intersection of technological potential and business aims.