A multi-stage game framework for new route promotion: Behavioral strategy and dynamic evolution of shippers, carriers, and governments

Abstract

New freight routes are being planned and emerging globally, but often rely on government subsidies to enhance their competitiveness during the initial promotional phase. This study proposes a multi-stage game framework to explore the influence mechanism of behavioral strategies among three stakeholders: shipper, carrier, and government. Based on the assessment of shippers’ route choice preferences, we examine the dynamic evolution of carriers’ and governments’ behavioral strategies in the practical context of bounded rationality and dynamic learning. We theoretically derive the evolutionary paths and stable outcomes of dynamic systems across eight scenarios encompassing all the possible practical values to be taken, which provide broader and more valuable decision support for new route promotion. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the proposed model are verified by the actual case of the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor. The findings indicate that government subsidies are not always effective and provide a precise subsidy range that can incentivize carriers to switch to the new route. Moreover, the study clarifies the impact of key factors such as subsidy, tax, route reliability, transportation time, and time value of cargo on the promotion of new routes through numerical simulation, and provides feasible management recommendations for government and route operations.