Moral equality and reprogenetic autonomy in the genomic era.

Abstract

In this paper, I question the argument from human dignity found in the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR) and in the recent views of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC). I focus on what this argument says about the permissibility of two broad categories of reprogenetic choices that may be available to prospective parents in the genomic era. The argument from human dignity holds that non-medical genetic selection and somatic enhancements ought to be prohibited because they violate the principle of human dignity. I argue that human dignity need not be violated by the enterprise of human genetic selection/somatic enhancement if reasonable social safeguards are established. In particular, I argue that respecting the reprogenetic choices of the decision-maker is paramount within the boundaries of (i) prohibiting the infliction of a shortened lifespan or pain upon the child; (ii) prohibiting the actualization of demeaning beliefs or intentions such as viewing certain groups as inferior; (iii) prohibiting the choice resulting from an expression of unwillingness to love and care for the child; and, with respect to somatic gene enhancements in particular, (iv) the potentially unjustified effects of the enhancement on others, if any, are reasonably addressable (and addressed) via social modifications so as to ensure the enhancement no longer risks adversely affecting them. With these limits, reprogenetic autonomy cannot be said to undermine the dignity of humans by creating unjustified harms or expressing demeaning ideas.