Non-controlling shareholders' network and excess goodwill: Evidence from listed companies in China

IF 7.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shaozheng Fu , Jinkun Yang , Jiajia Liu , Guoqiang Hu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of non-controlling shareholders' network on corporate excess goodwill using Chinese publicly listed companies from 2007 to 2020. We find that a stronger centrality of non-controlling shareholders' network leads to a significant decrease in excess goodwill resulting from mergers and acquisitions. This implies that the non-controlling shareholders' network has a significant inhibitory effect on the occurrence of goodwill bubbles. Mechanism analysis finds that non-controlling shareholders' network can inhibit excess goodwill thorough information effect, resource effect, and governance effect. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect is attributed to pressure-resistant institutional investors and individual investors, and is more pronounced in firms located in less developed intermediary market and legal system environment, as well as firms with lower audit quality. In summary, the non-controlling shareholders' network plays a positive role in curbing excess goodwill in listed companies.
非控股股东网络与超额商誉:来自中国上市公司的证据
本研究以 2007 年至 2020 年的中国上市公司为研究对象,探讨了非控股股东网络对企业超额商誉的影响。我们发现,非控股股东网络中心性越强,并购产生的超额商誉就会显著下降。这意味着非控股股东网络对商誉泡沫的发生具有显著的抑制作用。机制分析发现,非控股股东网络可以通过信息效应、资源效应和治理效应抑制过度商誉。此外,这种抑制效应归因于抗压的机构投资者和个人投资者,并且在中介市场和法律制度环境欠发达的企业以及审计质量较低的企业中更为明显。总之,非控股股东网络在抑制上市公司过度商誉方面发挥了积极作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
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