The accountability system for operation and investment and audit quality of state-owned enterprises

IF 7.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yanjun Wu , Wenchuan Chen , Han Yan
{"title":"The accountability system for operation and investment and audit quality of state-owned enterprises","authors":"Yanjun Wu ,&nbsp;Wenchuan Chen ,&nbsp;Han Yan","doi":"10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103680","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Based on the accountability system for illegal operation and investment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper uses A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2021 as a research sample to empirically test the impact of operation and investment accountability on the audit quality of firms. The results show that after the implementation of the accountability system, the audit quality of SOEs is significantly improved, and the results hold after a series of robustness checks. Mechanism tests suggest that reducing misconducts of managers, inhibiting earnings management and improving the quality of internal control can explain the effects of operation and investment accountability. Heterogeneity analyses suggest that the positive effect of operation and investment accountability on the audit quality of SOEs is more pronounced for firms in poor business environment, with low level of digital transformation and low degree of mixed-ownership reform. Further tests on economic consequence suggest that operation and investment accountability increase economic value added of state-owned assets by improving the effectiveness of auditing supervision. This paper extends the stream of literature on SOEs' auditing from the perspective of accountability, and provides practical implications on improving the quality of government monitoring measures and promoting the update of governance capacity and governance system.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48226,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Financial Analysis","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 103680"},"PeriodicalIF":7.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Financial Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521924006124","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Based on the accountability system for illegal operation and investment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper uses A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2021 as a research sample to empirically test the impact of operation and investment accountability on the audit quality of firms. The results show that after the implementation of the accountability system, the audit quality of SOEs is significantly improved, and the results hold after a series of robustness checks. Mechanism tests suggest that reducing misconducts of managers, inhibiting earnings management and improving the quality of internal control can explain the effects of operation and investment accountability. Heterogeneity analyses suggest that the positive effect of operation and investment accountability on the audit quality of SOEs is more pronounced for firms in poor business environment, with low level of digital transformation and low degree of mixed-ownership reform. Further tests on economic consequence suggest that operation and investment accountability increase economic value added of state-owned assets by improving the effectiveness of auditing supervision. This paper extends the stream of literature on SOEs' auditing from the perspective of accountability, and provides practical implications on improving the quality of government monitoring measures and promoting the update of governance capacity and governance system.
国有企业经营投资责任制和审计质量
本文以国有企业违规经营投资责任追究制度为基础,以2013-2021年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了经营投资责任追究对事务所审计质量的影响。结果表明,问责制度实施后,国有企业的审计质量显著提高,且经过一系列稳健性检验后结果成立。机制检验表明,减少管理者不当行为、抑制收益管理和提高内部控制质量可以解释经营与投资责任制的效果。异质性分析表明,经营与投资责任制对国有企业审计质量的正向影响对于经营环境差、数字化转型程度低、混合所有制改革程度低的企业更为明显。进一步的经济后果检验表明,经营与投资责任通过提高审计监督的有效性,增加了国有资产的经济增加值。本文从问责制的视角扩展了国有企业审计的文献流,对提高政府监督措施的质量、促进治理能力和治理体系的更新具有现实意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信