Requester mobility for mobile crowdsensing system: A dynamic alliance-based incentive mechanism

IF 4.4 3区计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Ad Hoc Networks Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI:10.1016/j.adhoc.2024.103680

Zhilin Xu , Hao Sun , Panfei Sun , Qianqian Kong

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In the Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) system, due to the heterogeneity of requesters, they are in mobile which means requesters will join or leave the MCS system at different times and their data demands are time-varying. The uncertainty of requesters caused by requester mobility will generate the instability of the match between requesters and participants which means the established matching algorithm cannot be completed due to the dissatisfaction of requesters and participants caused by the changes in the intensity of competition. For requester mobility, we design a dynamic alliance-based incentive mechanism where requesters can leave, join the MCS system separately, and change their data needs. To the instability, we divide the dynamic mechanism into different stages and will update the matching rules in each stage. A unique algorithm based on the dynamic Stackelberg game and the corresponding updated algorithm is proposed to analyze the matching strategies of requesters and participants to make an optimal match. By proving the stability of the updated rules, we guarantee the stability of the match with requester mobility. Through numerical analysis, alliance formation can significantly reduce weak requesters’ costs by at most 90%. Besides, in our mechanism any requester participates in the game at most twice, the chosen rate can be up to 100%.

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移动人群感应系统的请求者流动性：基于联盟的动态激励机制

在移动众测（MCS）系统中，由于请求者的异质性，他们处于移动状态，这意味着请求者会在不同时间加入或离开移动众测系统，他们的数据需求也是时变的。请求者的流动性导致的请求者的不确定性会造成请求者和参与者之间匹配的不稳定性，即由于竞争激烈程度的变化导致请求者和参与者的不满，既定的匹配算法无法完成。针对请求者的流动性，我们设计了一种基于联盟的动态激励机制，请求者可以分别离开、加入 MCS 系统，并改变自己的数据需求。针对不稳定性，我们将动态机制分为不同阶段，并在每个阶段更新匹配规则。我们提出了一种基于动态斯塔克尔伯格博弈的独特算法和相应的更新算法，以分析请求者和参与者的匹配策略，从而实现最优匹配。通过证明更新规则的稳定性，我们保证了请求者流动时匹配的稳定性。通过数值分析，联盟的形成可以大大降低弱请求者的成本，最多可降低 90%。此外，在我们的机制中，任何请求者最多参与两次博弈，选择率可达 100%。

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来源期刊

Ad Hoc Networks 工程技术-电信学

CiteScore

10.20

自引率

4.20%

发文量

131

审稿时长

4.8 months

期刊介绍： The Ad Hoc Networks is an international and archival journal providing a publication vehicle for complete coverage of all topics of interest to those involved in ad hoc and sensor networking areas. The Ad Hoc Networks considers original, high quality and unpublished contributions addressing all aspects of ad hoc and sensor networks. Specific areas of interest include, but are not limited to: Mobile and Wireless Ad Hoc Networks Sensor Networks Wireless Local and Personal Area Networks Home Networks Ad Hoc Networks of Autonomous Intelligent Systems Novel Architectures for Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks Self-organizing Network Architectures and Protocols Transport Layer Protocols Routing protocols (unicast, multicast, geocast, etc.) Media Access Control Techniques Error Control Schemes Power-Aware, Low-Power and Energy-Efficient Designs Synchronization and Scheduling Issues Mobility Management Mobility-Tolerant Communication Protocols Location Tracking and Location-based Services Resource and Information Management Security and Fault-Tolerance Issues Hardware and Software Platforms, Systems, and Testbeds Experimental and Prototype Results Quality-of-Service Issues Cross-Layer Interactions Scalability Issues Performance Analysis and Simulation of Protocols.